This paper reconsiders Joseph Farrell's (1987) and Matthew Rabin's (1994) 
The paper is organized as follows. Section I introduces the level-k model by using it to analyze Battle of the Sexes without preplay communication, following CHC's (Section III.C) level-k (or as they call it, "cognitive hierarchy") analysis of closely related market-entry games.
It has long been noted that subjects in market-entry experiments (Amnon Rapoport et al. (1998) 8 I do not consider one-sided communication because it begs the question of symmetry-breaking that is at the heart of the coordination problem in Battle of the Sexes. Nonetheless, as EÖ show, the model used here has the "right" implications to explain experimental results with one-sided as well as two-sided communication. Navin Kartik, and Rapoport and Darryl A. Seale (2002) ) regularly achieve better ex post coordination (number of entrants closer to market capacity) than in the symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium, the natural equilibrium benchmark. Earlier versions of this result led Daniel Kahneman (1988) to remark, "…to a psychologist, it looks like magic." CHC show that Kahneman's "magic" can be explained by a level-k model, in which the predictable heterogeneity of strategic thinking allows some players to mentally simulate others' entry decisions and accommodate them. The more sophisticated players become like Stackelberg followers, with coordination benefits for all. Section I's analysis adapts CHC's analysis to Battle of the Sexes, showing that level-k thinking yields similar symmetry-breaking benefits there. The analysis suggests a view of tacit coordination profoundly different from the traditional view: With level-k thinking, equilibrium and, a fortiori, selection principles such as risk-or payoff-dominance (John Harsanyi and Reinhard Selten (1988) ) play no direct role in players' strategic thinking. Coordination, when it occurs, is an almost accidental (though predictable) by-product of the use of non-equilibrium decision rules. These striking differences motivate a level-k analysis of explicit coordination: At the very least, a level-k analysis will shift the equilibrium benchmarks in Farrell's analysis. Section V is the conclusion.
Marco Ottaviani, and Francesco Squintani (2007) and those authors' earlier papers cited there introduced level-k models of one-sided strategic information transmission, in the limited sense of credulous receivers.
I. A Level-k Model of Tacit Coordination
This section introduces the level-k model by using it to analyze Battle of the Sexes without communication, following CHC's (Section III.C) analysis of market-entry games.
Level-k models allow behavior to be heterogeneous, but they assume that each player follows a rule drawn from a common distribution over a particular hierarchy of decision rules or types. I assume throughout that both player roles are filled from the same distribution of types, which restricts attention to symmetric outcome distributions, paralleling Farrell's restriction to the symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium.
As implemented here, type Lk anchors its beliefs in a nonstrategic L0 type and adjusts them via thought-experiments with iterated best responses: L1 best responds to L0, L2 to L1, and so on. L1 and higher types have accurate models of the game and are rational in that they choose best responses to beliefs. Their only departure from equilibrium is in replacing its assumed perfect model of others with simplified models that avoid the complexity of equilibrium analysis.
In applications the type frequencies are treated as behavioral parameters (or in CHC's cognitive hierarchy model, a parameterized distribution) to be estimated or translated from previous analyses. The estimated distribution is fairly stable across games, with most weight on L1, L2, and L3. The estimated frequency of the anchoring L0 type is usually 0 or very small; thus L0 exists mainly as L1's model of others, L2's model of L1's model, and so on. Even so, the specification of L0 is the main issue in defining a level-k model and the key to its explanatory power. L0 often needs to be adapted to the setting; but the definition of higher types via iterated best responses allows an empirically plausible explanation of behavior in most settings.
In CHC's market-entry games, n risk-neutral firms simultaneously decide whether to enter a market with capacity m < n. If m or fewer firms enter, the entrants all earn a profit; but if more than m enter they all earn a loss. Staying out yields zero. Like Battle of the Sexes, this game has a unique symmetric equilibrium in mixed strategies, in which the expected number of entrants is approximately m, but there are significant probabilities of over-or under-entry (Avinash Dixit and Carl Shapiro (1985) ). Yet in Rapoport et al.'s (1998) and Rapoport and Seale's (2002) experiments with closely related games, the numbers of entrants ex post were systematically closer to m than in the symmetric equilibrium.
How can subjects do systematically better than in the symmetric equilibrium? CHC show that this can be explained by a level-k model with an empirically plausible type distribution. In their model, L0 is uniformly random, the usual assumption for normal-form games. L1s mentally simulate L0s' random entry decisions and accommodate them, entering only if they expect enough L0s to stay out. L2s accommodate L1s' (and in CHC's model, unlike in mine, L0s') entry decisions; and so on. Even though players' decisions are simultaneous and there is no communication, the heterogeneity of strategic thinking allows more sophisticated types to accommodate less sophisticated types' decisions, just as (noisy) Stackelberg followers would. Now consider the closely related Battle of the Sexes game in Figure 1 , where a > 1 without loss of generality. Two players choose simultaneously between two pure actions, H for Hawk or D for Dove, using the standard labeling of the strategies from evolutionary game theory to emphasize the symmetry of actions and payoffs across player roles. The unique symmetric equilibrium is in mixed strategies, with p ≡ Pr{H} = a/(1+a) for both players. The expected coordination rate is 2p(1-p) = 2a/(1+a) 2 , and players' expected payoffs are a/(1+a) < 1, worse for each player than his worst pure-strategy equilibrium. Although L3 behaves like L1 here, and L4 behaves like L2, I retain all four for comparability with the analysis below. But I assume for simplicity, from now on, that the frequency of L0 is 0. Table 1 and the type frequencies. The type frequencies are assumed to be independent of payoffs, in keeping with the fact that, like equilibrium, they are intended as general models of strategic behavior (CGCB, CGC). Because in Battle of the Sexes, the outcomes of the possible type pairings are independent of a as long as a > 1, the payoffindependence of the type frequencies implies that the model's predicted outcome distribution is independent of a. By contrast, a has a strong influence on the equilibrium coordination rate, so this independence is important in the comparison between level-k and equilibrium rates.
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With symmetry, players have equal ex ante payoffs, which are proportional to the expected coordination rate, so little is lost by focusing on the coordination rate. Lumping L1 and L3 together and letting v denote their total probability, and lumping L2 and L4 together and letting (1-v) denote their total probability, the coordination rate is 2v(1-v), which is maximized at v = ½, where it takes the value ½. Thus for v near ½, which is empirically plausible in this setting, the coordination rate is close to ½. (However, for more extreme values of v the rate is worse, falling to 0 as v → 0 or 1.) By contrast, the mixed-strategy equilibrium coordination rate, 2a/(1+a) 2 , is maximized when a = 1 where it takes the value ½, and equals 4/9 when a = 2 and 3/8 when a = 3, converging to 0 like 1/a as a → ∞. Thus even for moderate values of a, the levelk coordination rate is quite likely to be higher than the equilibrium rate.
A player's ex ante (not conditioned on his type) expected payoff is (1+a)v(1-v). This too is maximized at v = ½, where it equals (1+a)/4, which is always greater than the a/(1+a) expected payoff of the mixed-strategy equilibrium. Thus for type frequencies near v = ½, the level-k model yields players greater ex ante expected payoffs than the mixed-strategy equilibrium; and for a > 3, greater even than in players' worst pure-strategy equilibria.
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From a mechanism-design point of view, the level-k model improves upon the symmetric equilibrium by "relaxing" the incentive constraints requiring players' responses to be in equilibrium. Because level-k types best respond to non-equilibrium beliefs, it is natural to compare the level-k outcome to the best symmetric rationalizable outcome, in which each player plays a non-equilibrium mixed strategy with v ≡ Pr{H} = ½. When v = ½, the level-k model can be viewed as using the heterogeneity of players' strategic thinking to purify this best symmetric rationalizable outcome. This is not to suggest that level-k thinking always makes this ideal outcome attainable: the type frequencies are behavioral parameters, not choice variables.
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As noted in the Introduction, the level-k model suggests a view of tacit coordination profoundly different from the traditional view: Equilibrium and selection principles such as riskor payoff-dominance play no direct role in players' strategic thinking; and coordination, when it occurs, is an almost accidental by-product of how paired players' types interact.
II. Farrell's Equilibrium Analysis of Communication
This section reviews Farrell's (1987) analysis of one-and multi-round communication in
Battle of the Sexes and the implications of Rabin's (1994) analysis in this setting.
Farrell's underlying game has a richer payoff parameterization than the Battle of the Sexes game in Figure 1 , but the added richness is not relevant here, so I use Figure 1 's game. In Farrell's model, the underlying game is preceded by one or more communication rounds in which players send simultaneous messages regarding their pure-strategy intentions. The messages are in a pre-existing common language and they are nonbinding and costless. I denote the possible messages "h" meaning "I intend to play H" and "d" meaning "I intend to play D".
Recall that Farrell studies the symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium in the entire game, including the communication phase, in which players take the first pair of messages that identify a pure-strategy equilibrium in the underlying game as an agreement to play that equilibrium, ignoring all previous messages. In Farrell's equilibrium, players randomize their messages in each round until either some round yields an equilibrium pair of messages, in which case they play that equilibrium; or the communication phase ends without an agreement, in which case they revert to the symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium in Battle of the Sexes. I will describe his equilibrium, which is subgame-perfect, by players' common values of q ≡ Pr{h} in each round and their common value of p ≡ Pr{H} if there is no agreement.
Farrell calculates the equilibrium rate of coordination failure (which is more convenient to work with than the rate of coordination) and studies how it depends on the number of rounds of communication. by plugging in the payoffs from the possible message pairs. The message game is qualitatively like Battle of the Sexes, but with different payoffs because it is not the last chance to coordinate.
The equilibrium q = a 2 /(1+a 2 ), and the equilibrium failure rate is therefore (1+a which is greater than the equilibrium coordination rate without communication, 2a/(1+a) 2 .
With abundant communication, the equilibrium failure rate is an infinite product that
, with a separate q for each round (Farrell's (7), p. 38). If the qs were independent of the number of rounds and bounded between 0 and 1, then the failure rate would approach 0 as the number grew without limit. But each q must be in equilibrium in its round's message game, and although the failure rate declines with the number of rounds, the equilibrium qs converge to 1 so quickly that the failure rate converges to a limit above 0 even with abundant communication. The limiting failure rate is (a-1)/(a+1), and the corresponding when a = 1, 2/3 when a = 2, and ½ when a = 3, while with one round the rate is 3/4 when a = 1, 28/45 ≈ 0.62 when a = 2, and 39/80 ≈ 0.49 when a = 3. Even so, Farrell's analysis shows that proposing and making non-binding agreements allows players to realize some of the benefits of an ideal binding agreement to play the best symmetric correlated equilibrium, which would yield expected payoff (1+a)/2 instead of the 1 they obtain in Farrell's equilibrium.
III. A Level-k Model with One Round of Communication
This 
A. Modeling two-sided level-k communication
The key difficulty in analyzing two-sided level-k communication is extending level-k types from normal-form games to extensive-form types that determine both messages and 11 Crawford and Haller (1990) provide an analogous analysis, in which players repeatedly play a tacit coordination game, using costly real-time play to generate precedents within their relationship that will eventually allow them to break the symmetry as needed; or, in other settings, to find more efficient ways to coordinate. 12 In analyzing one-sided communication, EÖ (Section 3.2) follow Crawford's (2003) specification of separate L0s for senders and receivers: a "credible" sender, which tells the truth; and a "credulous" receiver, which believes whatever it is told. Given these L0s, in Battle of the Sexes an L1 receiver will believe the message it receives and accommodate. An L1 sender will expect its message to be believed, and will therefore send message h and choose action H. L2 and higher senders will also send h and choose H. Thus L1, L2 and higher receivers will all choose D. Thus even one round of one-sided communication almost trivially solves the coordination problem. 13 If it is assumed instead that L0 uniformly and independently randomizes its message as well as its action, then communication is completely ineffective and the model reduces to Section I's model without communication. The credulous receiver type, because it deals with beliefs about another player's communication strategy, is arguably less fundamental than the credible sender type. Crawford and Iriberri (2007b) Table 2 gives the messages for all types and the coordination outcomes on the nonequilibrium path for all type pairings. "½H+½D, ½H+½D" refers to players' independently random choices in L1 versus L1, which make all four possible outcomes equally likely. Table 2 
C. Coordination outcomes
Type (message) L1 (random) L2 (h) L3 (d) L4 (h) L1 (random) ½H+½D, ½H+½D D, H H, D D, H L2 (h) H, D H, H H, D H, H L3 (d) D, H D, H D, D D, H L4 (h) H, D H, H H, D H, H
. Level-k Messages and Outcomes with One Round of Communication
There are three notable differences from Table 1 (Table 1) and with one round (Table 2) , respectively, the rate goes up from 0 to ½ for the pairing L1 versus L1, from 0 to 1 for the pairings L1 versus L3, and is otherwise unchanged. 16 Suppose for definiteness that the frequencies of L1, L2, L3, and L4 are Focusing on the model with one round of communication, he assumes that a message pair that identifies a pure-strategy equilibrium in Battle of the Sexes is treated as an agreement to play that equilibrium, and that players otherwise play the mixed-strategy equilibrium in that game.
As indicated in Table 2 , on the non-equilibrium path L1 sends a random message, L2 and L4 send h, and L3 sends d. In all twelve possible pairings from {L1, L2, L3, L4}, message pairs that identify an equilibrium in Battle of the Sexes always lead to both players playing that equilibrium. Thus, taken literally, the analysis justifies Farrell's assumption that a message pair that identifies an equilibrium is treated as an agreement to play that equilibrium.
However, the resulting agreements do not reflect the meeting of the minds that FR sought to model. Instead they reflect either one player's perceived credibility as a sender or the other's perceived credulity as a receiver, but never both at the same time. 17 As a result, pairings of L1 versus L2, L3, or L4 always lead to equilibrium play, without regard to whether or not the message pair identifies an equilibrium; and pairings of L1 versus L1 sometimes lead to equilibrium play, again without regard to whether or not the messages identify an equilibrium.
(For pairings from {L2, L3, L4}, only agreements lead to equilibrium play, and of the "right" equilibrium; but for these pairings communication never enhances coordination.) L1's listening skills bring about coordination often enough to raise the coordination rate well above the rate without communication. But a level-k analysis may not fully support the assumptions about agreements in Rabin's analysis of negotiated rationalizability. 17 L1 can be described as a good listener but a bad talker. L2, by contrast, is a good talker but a bad listener; and L3 and L4 are good talkers but mediocre listeners-mediocre because they choose the right action on the nonequilibrium path, but they are too sure of their beliefs to respond to their partners' messages when the messages contradict their beliefs. No type is both a good talker and a good listener, as would be required (at the least) for a full meeting of the minds. Higher-level types have communication skills no better than L1's through L4's. As Rabin notes, an equilibrium analysis also fails to explain a meeting of the minds, as opposed to assuming one. It is possible that a full meeting of the minds requires more than mechanical decision rules, something like a Gricean leap of the imagination (H. Paul Grice (1975) ). Compare the notion of "team reasoning" in the experimental coordination literature (e.g. Crawford, Gneezy, and Rottenstreich (2007) and the references cited there). As is usual in unanimity games, there is always an equilibrium in the request game in which neither player requests to continue. I simply assume that if continuing is better for both players, given their beliefs, then they both request to continue.
IV. A Level-k Model with Abundant Communication
I also assume, in the spirit of Section III's model, that players draw no inferences about their partners' types from the history of their interactions; and that in their request decisions they draw no conditional inferences about their partners' types (as equilibrium players do in Timothy J. Feddersen and Wolfgang Pesendorfer's (1996) analysis of the "swing voter's curse"). The assumption that players draw no inferences from history is obviously strained for some outcome paths; I maintain it anyway to make the most important points as simply as possible.
B. Types' communication strategies with abundant communication
The analysis of types' communication strategies with abundant communication builds on Section III's analysis to determine which type pairs, following which realized message pairs in the current round, decide to exercise the option to extend communication.
Note first that both players requesting to continue communication can never be better for both players if their current messages already identify a pure-strategy equilibrium in Battle of the Sexes. If communication is cut off they will play that equilibrium, which is fully Pareto-efficient
(not just efficient in the set of equilibria, which is not all that is relevant for level-k types). By continuing they incur the slight cost of an additional round of communication, and no deviation from the Pareto-efficient current agreement could make that worthwhile for both of them.
This implies (finding Table 3 gives the coordination outcomes on the non-equilibrium path for all type pairings with abundant communication. As in Table 2 , "½H+½D, ½H+½D" refers to the uniform distribution over the four possible coordination outcomes for L1 versus L1 following message pair h,h when a < 2. The outcomes with abundant communication are the same as with one round, except that if a > 2, L1 versus L1 now have coordination rate 2/3 instead of ½; and some exogenous randomness might allow L3 versus L3 to raise its coordination rate above its rate of 0 with one round. greater than the equilibrium coordination rate, 2/(1+a), which equals 1 when a = 1, 2/3 when a = 2, and converges to 0 like 1/a as a → ∞, whenever a > 1.94 and possibly for lower values of a.
To the extent that level-k types do better than in Farrell's equilibrium, they do so because, as in Section I's analysis, the level-k model relaxes the equilibrium incentive constraints.
Just as for equilibrium, the benefits of abundant communication are limited and most of the gains from communication would be realized with only one round. (Here, oddly, the benefits of abundant communication are more limited when a is small, because L1 versus L1 following message pair h,h then cut off communication, reducing L1 versus L1's coordination rate.
V. Conclusion
This paper has reconsidered FR's analyses of coordination via preplay communication,
focusing on Farrell's analysis of Battle of the Sexes and replacing FR's equilibrium and rationalizability assumptions with a structural non-equilibrium model based on level-k thinking.
The analysis gives a unified treatment of players' messages and actions and how messages create agreements, and allows a reevaluation of FR's assumptions on how players use language.
With one round of communication, the analysis justifies FR's assumption that a message pair that identifies an equilibrium leads to that equilibrium. However, the resulting "agreements"
do not fully reflect the meeting of the minds that FR sought to model. Instead they reflect either one player's perceived credibility as a sender or the other's perceived credulity as a receiver, never both at the same time. As a result, a level-k analysis may not fully support the assumptions about agreements in Rabin's analysis of negotiated rationalizability. Further, with abundant communication, as Rabin's analysis of negotiated rationalizability suggests, level-k players need not keep communicating until an agreement is reached as in Farrell's equilibrium.
Finally, a level-k analysis implies very different conclusions than Farrell's equilibrium analysis about the effectiveness of communication in Battle of the Sexes. The level-k coordination rate in that game, unlike the equilibrium rate, is largely independent of the difference in players' preferences. Even with moderate differences in preferences, for plausible type distributions the level-k coordination rate is likely to be higher than the equilibrium rate, with or without communication. The level-k model's predictions with abundant communication are consistent with Rabin's bounds based on negotiated rationalizability, but their precision yields additional insight into the causes and consequences of breakdowns in negotiations.
